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Is Honesty Always the Best Policy ?
Tilman Ehrbeck* and Robert Waldmann** 
* International Monetary Fund 
** European University Institute
October 20 1995
Honesty may not be the best policy for professional forecasters if the 
pattern of forecasts reveals valuable information about the forecasters 
even before the outcome is realised. Rational forecasters will 
compromise between minimizing errors and mimicking prediction 
patterns typical of able forecasters. Simple models based on this 
argument imply that forecasts are biased in the direction of forecasts 
typical of able forecasters. Our models of strategic bias are rejected 
empirically as forecasts are biased in directions typical of forecasters 
with large mean squared forecast errors. This observation is consistent 
with behavioral explanations of forecast bias.
We would like to thank Jonathan Hamilton, Gerhard Orosel, Lisa 
Lynch, Alessandra Pelloni, Danny Quah, Ailsa Roell, Richard Thaler, 
and participants in the London School of Economics Financial Markets 
workshop, in the seminar series of Institut de Analisi Economica of the 
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and in the European University 
Institute Macroeconomics W orkshop for helpful comments. They 
usual caveat applies. The views expressed in this paper are those of 























































































































































































Can the apparent rejection of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis in survey 
forecast data be explained by Rational Cheating? The considerable number of stud­
ies that rejected the testable implications of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis 
using survey data [e.g. Pesando 1975; Carlson 1977; Pearce 1979, Figlewski and 
Wachtel 1981; Ito 1990] rely on the joint hypothesis that survey participants aim at 
minimizing squared forecast errors. However, as Scharfstein and Stein [1990] have 
argued, fully rational agents might choose to announce forecasts different from the 
conditional expected value of the variable to be predicted.
This paper introduces and tests the implications of advising games where advi­
sors make many different forecasts of the same realization of the same variable. In 
this setting it can be possible to estimate an advisor’s ability before the realization 
of the variable. Advisors who are concerned about their reputation when disclosing 
repeated forecasts to their clients will have other aims in addition to minimizing 
forecast errors. For example, they might not want to deviate too much from the 
previous announcements, or they might want to suggest that their new forecast 
contains significant new information. In which way advisors balance their joint ob­
jective to minimize forecasts errors and to look good before the outcome is observed 
depends on the specific model and the evaluation rule clients optimally employ in 
order to determine the ability of their advisors. For any specification, the models 
predict a rational bias in the forecast error.
Additionally, the cross-sectional implications of the models make it possible 
for us to distinguish between rational cheating as implied by the advising games 
and behavioral models of predictable forecast errors as advanced by the growing 
school of thought that incorporates psychological elements into decision making 
[e.g. Kahneman et. al 1982]. In our models advisors announce biased forecasts 
because it makes them look good. For example, if repeated forecasts of the same 
outcome axe biased away from previous forecasts, it must be because the clients’ 
perception is that advisors who change there forecasts by a large amount make 
good forecasts. Behavioral models do not have such implications.
The empirical results in this paper reject all of our advising games. For model 
specifications that would explain the observed forecast error bias, the cross-sectional 
implications are rejected, and for model specifications that have valid cross-sectional 
implications, the bias in the forecast error is unexplained. Thus, the data reject 
our general approach to rationalizing biased forecasts and not narrow assumptions 
of our models.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section two formalizes an example of the advising 
game and discusses testable implications. Section three presents empirical tests 
using a small panel data set of published predictions of short-term interest rates in 
the U.S.. Section four shows how different models of strategic bias are rejected by 



























































































II. M odels of A dvice
Rational agents may choose to report public forecasts different from their sub­
jective mean predictions if honesty is not always the best policy. We assume that 
professional forecasters choose forecasts in order to convince clients that forecast 
errors are small. Clearly, this provides an incentive to report forecasts close to the 
forecaster’s belief about the expected value of the variable forecast. However, it also 
may create incentives to provide a pattern of forecasts which imply small expected 
forecast errors before the outcome is observed. This means that Nash equilibrium 
forecasts could be biased . Rational clients, in turn, suspecting this, adjust advisors’ 
forecasts for their own use. In Nash equilibrium, clients do not make systematic 
forecast errors. The efforts of professional forecasters to convince their clients that 
they have precise information might reduce the efficiency of communication, but it 
does not cause systematic confusion. If the actual signal is interpreted as part of 
the outcome, then as in the signalling literature, many equilibria are possible. In 
this model, a change of a stated forecast “means” that the forecasters’ beliefs about 
the conditional mean of the forecast variable have changed by a greater amount.
To formalize this idea, consider the following general set-up. Let there be two 
agents in the following simple model of advice -  an advisor and a client . The 
forecaster provides the client with two predictions of the value of a random variable 
y. The client uses these stated predictions to form his own forecast of the value of 
the variable. The client also attempts to determine the quality of the forecaster’s 
information analyzing the stated forecasts and the realized value of the predicted 
variable. If the client concludes that the forecaster has poor information, he termi­
nates the relationship and looks for a new forecaster. If the client is not convinced 
that the forecaster has poor information, the game is repeated. The forecaster at­
tempts to convince the client that he has high quality information. For simplicity, 
assume a forecaster who has no other aim.
In our games, it is assumed that the i-th forecaster receives signal in period 
1, makes a first forecast f u , then receives signal S2> in period 2 and makes another 
forecast /21. Finally the outcome y is realized.
First, we consider a simple model of advice where we describe a Nash equilibrium 
in which forecasters play pure strategies and in which more able forecasters are 
more willing than less able forecasters to admit that they were wrong. In this first 
example of our game, it is assumed that the i-th forecaster receives signals:
(1) si, =  y +  <Ti(ei +  r/0 




























































































The expected value of y conditional on su is equal to sti, <7j is a parameter which 
describes the quality of the signal and:
~  Af(0,1)
{ 1 with probability |—1 with probability |
For still more simplicity assume that there are only two types of forecasters -  some 
with <7, =  1 and the rest with <x< =  a > 1. To simplify notation, we suppress 
subscript i in this section.
In the second period, the optimal forecast of y is sa- There is no reason why the 
able forecaster would not frankly state his new prediction. The less able forecasters, 
however, will not state this prediction. If they did, the absolute value of their change 
in predictions, (fa — fu) =  (sa — Su) =  — a,?}, would be equal to a > 1. The 
client would know that the forecaster received poor signals, since an able forecaster 
would never change a prediction by more than 1 in either direction. The less able 
forecasters rationally choose to adjust their predictions up 1 if Sa > s u and down 
1 if s2i < Sh. Observing only the stated predictions fu  and / 2i, the client has no 
way of distinguishing between able and less able forecasters. When y is revealed, 
the client has some information on the quality of advice, but not enough to catch 
incompetence with certainty. This makes the dishonest strategy optimal [Ehrbeck 
and Waldmann 1994, Waldmann 1995].
We have considered only the Nash equilibrium in which rational forecasters are 
frank, arguing that this is focal. Since we consider a game of costless communi­
cation, there are a huge number of Nash equilibria (consider English and German 
for example). In fact, we can generate a new Nash equilibrium by applying any 
one-to-one R 2 - to - R2 function to (fu, fa )  as given in e.g. the Nash equilibrium 
described above. In Nash equilibrium, the client will know this function and will be 
able to invert it. This causes no change in the information transmitted or payoffs 
for either player. This makes it unlikely that any refinement of Nash equilibrium 
will eliminate this multiplicity (which occurs in all models considered in this pa­
per). The predictions of our model and our empirical results might be invalidated 
because we do not know which of this huge number of Nash equilibria is being 
played. The agents in our game might be speaking a different language than we 
imagine, for example, by describing interest rates in basis points instead of in per­
cent. Pre-play communication, such as the specific definitions of terms provided 
by the publisher of the data used in our empirical section, does not eliminate these 
equilibria. However, we are not concerned by such multiplicities, because they seem 
to require the almost telepathic properties of Nash equilibrium. The relationship 
between professional forecasters and clients is impersonal and often temporary. We 
see no reason why we alone should be ignorant of the Nash equilibrium being played 
or why our ignorance would be dispelled if we ceased to theorize and became clients 
of professional forecasters ourselves.
We also consider to be unreasonable Nash equilibria in which sophisticated fore­




























































































forecasts. For example, if all forecasters gave arbitrary constant or random fore­
casts unrelated to their signal, agents would ignore the forecasts when attempting 
to learn about the ability of forecasters and would have no reason to attempt to 
learn anyway. Given our assumptions this would give a large class of Nash equi­
libria. Clearly the example mentioned above is unreasonable as clients would have 
no reason to pay for arbitrary forecasts in the first place. It may be that there are 
more plausible Nash equilibria of this type, but it seems unlikely that they would 
survive refinement, as able forecasters act in a way which is counter to their clients’ 
interests and which makes it more difficult for their clients to assure themselves of 
the able forecaster’s ability.
This leaves the extremely strong and simple assumptions about the distribution 
of 7ji as a weak point of our analysis.
Below, we relax the assumptions about the distribution of r?;. To keep the 
notation simple we assume that 77* and e* have the same distribution. It is possible 
to find Nash equilibria in which forecasters play pure strategies for a broad class of 
assumptions about this distribution. For other assumptions, no such equilibrium 
exists.
Here we assume that 1% and e* are distributed with a density function described 
as
where c* is as before 1 or a > 1. We make fairly strong assumptions about h 
both to ensure tractability and to guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium in 
which forecasters play pure strategies. We assume that h has bounded support and 
so without loss of generality assume that
We assume that h is symmetric, continuous, and strictly concave and that for
( 2)
(3) h(x) =  0 i f  |x| > 1.
all x
(4)
To describe clients aims more precisely, we assume that if the posterior odds 
ratio that the forecaster is able is less than pmin, then the client terminates the 



























































































exactly pmm, the client is indifferent between keeping the current forecaster and 
looking for a new one. Clients are assumed to observe only the forecasts which 
they purchase and outcomes, so they choose a new forecaster at random. Given 
the behavior of clients there are, in principal, three sorts of second period forecasts. 
Those which imply a posterior odds ratio less than pmi„ and loss of a client which 
will not occur in Nash equilibrium, those which imply a posterior odds ratio of more 
them pmin which will occur, and those which imply a posterior odds ratio of exactly 
Pmin which will occur with positive probability. In Nash equilibrium a broad range 
of forecasts imply a posterior odds ratio of exactly pmln which makes it possible for 
us to consider clients’ mixed strategies in which the probability of terminating the 
relationship is a freely chosen function of the change in forecast. This gives us a 
continuum of degrees of freedom and makes it possible to find a Nash equilibrium.
The forecasters are assumed to have infinite time preference and so to care only 
about whether the client terminates the relationship before paying for the next 
forecast. As above we only consider Nash equilibria in which able forecasters are 
frank. First the optimal strategy of the less able forecaster (i) is of the form given 
by,
(5) fu  — Sli
fa  =  fu  +  g(sa — sii),
for some function g. This is clearly true because of the definitions of and S2i 
and the symmetry of the distributions of p and e.
As noted above the analysis of the less able forecasters’ strategies depends on 
the resulting clients’ posterior odds ratio. If the change in signal (s2> — Sii =  —p>) is 
small, the forecaster can be honest about this change without worrying about losing 
the client. In this case, the forecaster’s only concern is that a second period forecast 
error greater than 1 in absolute value will imply loss of the client. Therefore, the 
forecaster announces f 2i =  s^, the forecast which minimizes this risk. For larger p,, 
the forecaster will announce a forecast such that the posterior odds ratio is exactly 
Pmin- Nash equilibrium g must be such that this occurs for a variety of values of 
P i  and resulting values of f 2i — fu  =  g(s2 i -  S h ) .  This leaves us free to choose 
the probability that the client terminates the relationship as a function of f 2i — fu  
in order to make the function g optimal for the forecaster. Finally as is shown in 
Waldmann [1995] inequality (4) implies that it is indeed optimal for able advisor 
(j) to be frank and announce f 2j = s2j  given the clients’ strategy. This means that 
we have found a Nash equilibrium of the game.
The reasoning above implies that g is monotonically increasing and differentiable 
and that its derivative is less than or equal to 1. For p close to zero the less able 
forecasters are frank. For larger p the less able forecasters are rationally stubborn 
as is formally proven in Waldmann [1995]. Together these observations imply that 
the expected value of the regression coefficient of {f2 — y) on ( f2 — / j)  is negative. 




























































































Second, the variance of ( /2j — fu )  is greater for less able forecasters than for able 
forecasters. This follows from the fact that less able forecasters balance their desire 
to make small changes in forecasts like able forecasters and their desire to make 
small forecast errors like more able forecasters. Clearly expected squared forecast 
errors are greater for less able forecasters. They would be greater even if less able 
forecasters minimized mean squared forecast errors, and less able forecasters do 
not minimize mean squared forecast errors in Nash equilibrium. Therefore, across 
forecasters, mean squared changes in forecasts are positively correlated with mean 
squared forecast errors. This is our cross sectional prediction.
Thus the model gives two predictions -  each of the less able forecasters changes 
his forecast too little to minimize expected squared errors, yet when different fore­
casters are compared those with larger expected squared changes in forecasts still 
have larger expected squared forecast errors. The reason for these two predictions 
is very simple. Less able forecasters balance their desire to have small changes in 
forecasts like able forecasters and their desire to have small forecast errors like able 
forecasters.
It is easy to modify advising games to eliminate the prediction that forecast 
errors are negatively correlated with the change in forecasts. It is extremely difficult, 
however, to eliminate this prediction without reversing the prediction that large 
mean squared changes in forecast are correlated with large mean squared forecast 
errors. In the remainder, this section presents two modified models which imply 
different predictions about the rational bias in forecasts. Each implies that forecasts 
are biased in the direction which creates a pattern typical of able forecasters, which, 
in turn, implies a cross sectional prediction.
The second specification in this section implies over-adjustment of the publicly 
announced forecasts from first- to second period signals. As before, the forecaster 
receives two signals. However, in this model, the quality of the first signal is identical 
for all forecasters, and the quality of the second signal varies across forecasters. This 
can be viewed as better interpretation of previous information in later periods. The 
client in this model attempts to learn about the improvement in the quality of the 
forecaster’s signals. For example assume that e and y are independent, that the 
sum of e and r) has the same distribution for all forecasters and 7? has a higher 
variance for more able forecasters. In Nash equilibrium forecasters will not make a 
second forecast equal to the expected value of y given their signals. Consider what 
clients would do if forecasters were frank. In contrast to the previous model a large 
difference between the new and the old announcement is a good sign, since more 
able forecasters have a larger variance of r/. Therefore if clients believe forecasters 
are frank, forecasters will be rationally jumpy and will change their forecasts too 
much. This implies an expected positive coefficient in the regression of ( /2 -  y) 
on ( /2 — /1). This occurs because a large change in the forecast is a good sign -  
a sign of high quality second period information. For this to be true, it must also 
be true that forecasters who change their forecast by a large amount have small 
second period forecast errors.
For our third specification we relax the strong assumption that clients observe 




























































































boasting presented below would imply that forecasters choose to under-utilise the 
information contained in the average of past predictions. The motive is again that 
each forecaster tries to make clients believe in superior forecaster’s information than 
is warranted.
If forecasters know the average of first period forecasts (ft), then for normally 
distributed disturbances the expected squared error minimizing forecast will be a 
weighted average of the current signal, the first period signal and a weighted average 
of first period forecasts [Ehrbeck 1993]. For a simple example, the average of first 
period forecasts (/i) might be the optimal combination of all publicly available first 
period data. In this special case, the expected squared error minimizing forecast 
( f2i) is a weighted average of the average of first period forecasts and the second 
period signal. The weight on the second signal increases in the quality of the second 
period signal. In a simple example in which both (y — s2i) and (y — f i ) are normally 
distributed, lower variance of (y — s^) implies higher variance of ( /2’, — ft) . This 
suggests that it may be rational for forecasters to overstate the difference between 
their second period estimate of y and f t .  That is, forecasters may rationally put a 
higher weight on .s'2, than would minimize expected squared forecast errors. This 
version of rational cheating has two implications : first that (/*  — y) is positively 
correlated with ( f2i — ft)  and second that high mean squared ( /2, — f t)  is correlated 
with low mean squared forecast errors.
The logic of rational cheating is always the same for each of the models we 
consider -  less able forecasters balance their desire to have small forecast errors 
with their desire to have a pattern of repeated forecasts typical of able forecasters. 
This implies a fairly strong prediction. In each case we predict that forecasts are 
biased in a direction which creates a pattern typical of able forecasters. This general 
prediction makes our models of rational cheating distinguishable from behavioral 
models of predictable forecast errors [Andreasson 1987; 1990; Andreasson and Kraus 
1990; Case and Shiller 1988; De Bondt and Thaler 1990; De Long et al. 1990; 
Einhom and Hogarth 1978; Frankel and Froot 1988; Grether 1980; Kahneman et 
al. 1982]. If the bias in forecasts were due to less than full rationality, one can easily 
obtain the opposite prediction. If forecasters have a behavioral bias and some have 
a larger bias than others, one would expect (other things equal) that the forecasts 
with the larger bias would have larger mean squared forecast errors. This is the 
opposite of the pattern we predict and enables us to test all of our models, and 




























































































III. Testing Rational Stubbornness
To test the first implication of our first two advising games, data is necessary in 
which identified forecasters predict several times the value of some economic variable 
for the same target period. The North Holland Economic Forecast data is one such 
source. In this monthly newsletter, forecasts from a panel of experts of key economic 
variables for industrialized countries are published. The prediction variable used 
for this work is the forecast of the annualized discount rate on new issues of 91- 
day US-Treasury Bills, based on weekly auction average rates. This variable has 
been chosen because the panel for the U.S. is the richest and because interest rate 
forecasts predict a quoted price which reduces definitional ambiguities that arise 
when predicting, e.g. national income data. Each month the panel of experts 
submits predictions of the average interest rate for the quarters of the calendar 
year. The forecast data have consequently been split in three, small homogeneous 
panels of first month, second month, and third month forecasts respectively. For the 
empirical test, only forecasts of those panel participants who reported at least 15 
times over the sample period from January 1985 to June 1990 have been included. 
The cross-section dimension of the data is N = 23. The times-series dimension 
is T  = 22. The average number of non-missing observations per participant is 
between 18 and 19 for each forecast horizon. The realization data needed for the 
error calculations come from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Quarterly averages of 
discount rates are calculated as the simple average of the monthly data which are 
quoted on an annualized discount basis. For the regression analysis, the data have 
been stacked across agents per period and along time:
(6) Y =  X/3 +  u
where Y  is the T N x  1 -stack of second period forecast errors, X is the T N x 2  -stack 
of constant terms and changes in predictions from the first period to the second 
period, (3 is the 2 x 1  vector of regression coefficients, and u is the T N x  1 -stack 
of disturbance terms. Keane and Runkle [1990] have noted that this regression can 
be used to test the joint hypothesis of rational expectations and a quadratic loss 
function.
When running such regressions, care needs to be taken for possible correlation 
between forecast errors because forecasters are likely to be surprised by the same 
aggregate shocks as Chamberlain [1984] and Keane and Runkle [1990] have empha­
sized. Ignoring this potential correlation would lead to incorrectly low standard 
errors and thus spurious rejection of the null hypothesis.
More precisely, for our first set of estimated standard errors, we assume:
(7) JJ(uft) =  of for all t =  1,...,T ; i =  1,...,N




























































































This specification allows for heteroskedasticity of the disturbances across units and 
for non-zero contemporaneous correlation between the disturbances in different 
units, but excludes (time) serial correlation. The common correlation coefficient p 
reflects the assumption of an aggregate surprise.
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Individual OLS regressions can be run for each forecaster separately to obtain 
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where T) is the number of periods with observations for forecaster i, 7y is the 
number of periods with observations for both forecasters i and j ,  and py is the 
sample correlation coefficient for any pair of forecasters
Using fl, we can run the regression of the stacked data in equation (6) to ob­
tain an estimate of f3 and correct the estimated standard errors of the coefficient 
estimates as
(12) (X 'X )-1X 'A X (X 'X )-1
This approach gives efficient estimates of Vcovp under the strong assumptions 
described above. Below, we calculate five different estimates of Vcovp based on 
weaker assumptions. We report this variety of estimates because we aim to calculate 




























































































In each case, the variance covariance matrix of /3 is estimated as follows.
(13) VCOVg = (X 'X)-1^  ( E X ili« ) '(E X ,A 1) j(X 'X )-1
where Xit is the observation for forecaster i in period t , (1, change in forecast) if 
the change in forecast is available and (0,0) if no change in forecast is available; 
u is an estimate of the disturbances which we hope gives reasonable estimates of 
variances and covariances. Each of the live sets of t-like statistics calculated with 
equation (13) are based on different estimates of u. For our second set of estimated 
t-like statistics we relax the assumption of time invariant individual specific het- 
eroskedasticity and constant equal correlation of forecast errors across individuals. 
These t-like statistics are calculated with equation (13) for estimated disturbances 
calculated according to equation (14) using residuals from individual regressions, 
ej, and correcting for the number of degrees of freedom lost in estimation.
This might appear to imply a large gain in robustness. However, the resulting 
standard errors are biased down in small samples such as ours (recall the variance- 
covariance matrix is calculated with residuals from separate regressions for each 
individual). The resulting t-like statistics are reported in parentheses in the second 
row of reported t-like statistics in each table. For our third estimated variance 
covariance matrix of /3 we use raw forecast errors. Under the null, the disturbances 
to our regression equation are equal to the forecast errors. If uu in equation (13) is 
estimated with the forecast error of forecaster i in period t, the resulting estimate 
of the variance covariance matrix of beta is unbiased under the null of rational 
expectations and a quadratic loss function. If, on the other hand, forecast errors are 
predictable, the resulting estimate will be biased up by a positive definite matrix. If 
forecast errors are independent across time, the resulting test has almost no power 
against the alternative that they are correlated with the change in forecast. The 
resulting t-like statistics are reported in parentheses in the third row of reported 
t-like statistics in each table. They provide extremely robust tests with extremely 
low power. The fourth set of t-like statistics is calculated using equation (13) 
with residuals obtained from individual regressions excluding the time period in 
question. In other words, for each forecaster i and for each period t we estimate an 
individual regression excluding data from period t and use the resulting parameter 
estimates to calculate a residual for period t. The resulting estimated variance 
covariance matrix is biased up by a positive definite matrix. Thus, if the fourth 
and second set of estimated standard errors are similar, one can be fairly confident 
that neither bias is large. These t-like statistics are reported in parentheses as the 
fourth set of t-like statistics in each table. Finally, the fifth set of t-like statistics 
is calculated with equation (13) using residuals from pooled regressions excluding 





























































































regression excluding data from period t and use the resulting parameter estimates to 
calculate residuals for period t. Again, the resulting estimated variance covariance 
matrix is biased up by a positive definite matrix. These t-like statistics are reported 
in parentheses as the fifth set of t-like statistics in each table.
The results of the three regressions using the changes in forecasts from the first 
month to the third month, the first month to the second, and the second to the 
third as regressors are summarized in Table 1. Recall the prediction from our first 
model that forecast errors are negatively correlated with changes in forecasts. In 
all three regressions, the estimated coefficients have the wrong sign. All of the t- 
like statistics for the regression coefficients of the forecast error on the change from 
the first to the third month and on the change from the second to the third month 
are significant. For the regression coefficient on the change in forecast from the 
first to the second period, t- like statistics calculated with residuals from individ­
ual regressions including the time period in question are significant. Forecasters 
in this particular sample do not choose to place too much weight on old fore­
casts as predicted in Waldmann [1991],[1995] and our model presented in section 2 
above. To the contrary, the forecasters in this panel put too much weight on their 
new information or, at least, change their forecast too much. Correcting for that 
bias would improve their forecast. In particular, the improvement in the forecasts 
made in the third month of the quarter is unambiguously statistically significant. 
Whether one considers improvements to the forecasts made in the second month 
of the quarter to be significant depends on whether one is willing to assume that 
the variance of forecast errors is constant and that the correlation of forecast errors 
across different pairs of forecasters is identical. It is clear that both the Rational 
Expectations Hypothesis with a quadratic loss function and the model proposed 
above are strongly rejected by our data assuming that our interpretation of the 
variable to be forecasted is accepted by survey participants and their clients.
The results reported above are valid only under the assumption that our inter­
pretation of the phrase “Treasury bill ra te , th ree  m onths, percent: Discount 
rate on new issues of 91-day Treasury bills. Based on the weekly auction average 
rates” in Economic Forecasts is unambiguously correct. Recall that forecasts of 
the yield of 91-day TVeasury bills was chosen to minimize the ambiguity in variable 
definitions. Unfortunately, the definition of the quarterly average has an element 
of ambiguity. It might mean the average of three values of the monthly series pub­
lished in the Federal Reserve Bulletin as we assume. Alternatively, it could be the 
average over the 13 weekly auctions which take place in the quarter. Fortunately, 
it is possible to use the data in Economic Forecasts to see whether the survey 
participants agree about the definition of the variable which they are forecasting. 
Economic Forecasts uses a standard format for surveys of different variables and in 
each case asks for “forecasts” of the variables for the previous quarter. In the case 
of the yield on 91-day TVeasury bill this seems an easy task since all the relevant 
data on realizations is publicly available. However, even in the third month of the 
following quarter the back-casts are not all identical to our interpretation of the 
outcome nor are they all the same. Assuming that this reflects sincere disagreement 




























































































convince extremely naive clients that the forecaster has not made a mistake) this 
introduces ambiguity in our notion of forecast errors. We can use the back- casts to 
test the hypothesis that forecasters announce optimal forecasts of their own, later- 
period back- casts. To avoid loosing too many data points we use the average of all 
available back-casts for each forecaster as our back-cast variable. Nonetheless, some 
forecasters announce no back casts at all for some quarters so the number of obser­
vations are somewhat reduced. As reported in Table 2, the results with back-casts 
are almost identical to the results with outcomes. Forecasters do not minimize the 
expected squared difference between their forecasts and their own back-casts. They 
also do not report biased predictions of the sort predicted by our model. Instead 
of putting too much weight on their previous forecasts they change their forecasts 
too much. The results with back-casts reported in Table 2 are strikingly similar 
to the results with outcomes reported in Table 1. This strongly suggests that the 
rejection of rational expectations with a quadratic loss function and the rejection 
of our model are not due to ambiguity in definition of the variable to be forecasted.
To test the second (cross sectional) prediction of our model we compare the 
magnitude of changes in forecasts to the magnitude of forecast errors. To do this 
we first calculate for each forecaster the mean squared change in forecast from 
e.g. the second to the third month. Then we calculate the mean squared forecast 
error for each forecaster. Then we regress the mean squared forecast error on the 
mean squared change. This is a regression across the 23 forecasters. Clearly the 
disturbances in this regression are not normally distributed so we also report the 
rank correlation coefficient of the mean squared change in forecast and the mean 
squared forecast error. Recall that the model of rational stubbornness implies that 
small changes in forecasts are correlated with small forecast errors, but that Tables 1 
and 2 already demonstrate that it is false. On the other hand the results reported in 
Tables 1 and 2 can only be rationalized if there is an incentive to change forecasts by 
a large amount. This means that our basic approach to explaining biased forecasts 
by rational cheating requires large changes in forecasts to be correlated with small 
forecast errors.
In fact mean squared changes in forecasts are strongly positively correlated with 
mean squared forecast errors as is shown in Table 3.
We can rationalize the results reported in Tables 1 and 2 as it is easy to find 
models which give the opposite of the prediction of rational stubbornness, but 
we have not been able to obtain a fully rational model in which forecasters change 
forecasts too much and in which the forecasters who make large changes in forecasts 
have larger mean squared forecast errors. Such forecasters damage their reputation 
twice, by making poor forecasts and by producing a pattern of forecasts typical of 






























































































The results presented above can be interpreted as strengthening the rejection of 
the Rational Expectations Hypothesis. The failure to reconcile systematic forecast 
errors with an optimizing model supports the view the rejection is meaningful and 
does not reflect a misinterpretation of the optimization problem which rational 
forecasters attempt to solve. Alternatively, the empirical results can be used to 
try to specify different advising games which rationalize the observed behavior. It 
is easy to modify the advising game to eliminate the false prediction that forecast 
errors are negatively correlated with the change in forecasts. It is extremely difficult, 
however, to eliminate this prediction without reversing the correct prediction that 
large mean squared changes in forecast are correlated with large mean squared 
forecast errors. In the remainder, this article presents two modified models which 
avoid one but not both false predictions. The fact that we have not been able to 
find a model of rational cheating which is not rejected by the data strengthens the 
rejection of our approach to rationalizing biased forecasts and so strengthens the 
evidence against the rational expectations hypothesis.
The first specification in this section implies over-adjustment of the publicly 
announced forecasts from first- to second period signals. As before, in this modified 
model the forecaster receives two signals. However, in this model, the quality of 
the first signal is identical for all forecasters, and the quality of the second signal 
varies across forecasters. This can be viewed as better interpretation of previous 
information in later periods. The client in this model attempts to learn about 
the improvement in the quality of the forecaster’s signals. For example assume 
that e and r) are independent, that the sum of t and 77 has the same distribution 
for all forecasters and 77 has a higher variance for more able forecasters. In Nash 
equilibrium forecasters will not make a second forecast equal to the expected value 
of y given their signals. Consider what clients would do if forecasters were frank. 
In contrast to the previous model able forecasters a large difference between the 
new and the old announcement is a good sign, since more able forecasters have a 
larger variance of 77. Therefore if clients believe forecasters are frank, forecasters 
will be rationally jumpy and will change their forecasts too much (proof available 
on request). This implies an expected sign of the coefficient in the regression of 
(h  — 2/) on ( /2 — /1) ' s compatible with the empirical findings summarized in Tables 
1 and 2. However, this occurs because a large change in the forecast is a good sign 
-  a sign of high quality second period information. For this to be true, it must be 
true that forecasters who change their forecast by a large amount have small second 
period forecast errors. This is contradicted by the results reported in Table 3.
We now consider relaxing the strong assumption that clients observe only the 
forecasts of the forecaster whom they employ. The model of rational boasting 
presented below would imply that forecasters snub the information contained in 
the average of past predictions. The motive is again that each forecaster tries to 
make clients believe in superior forecaster’s information than is warranted. This 




























































































know the average of month old forecasts. In the earlier models we assumed that 
clients never observe the forecasts of forecasters other than the one they employ 
and that forecasters never learn each others’ forecasts. In fact, the existence of our 
data set shows that old forecasts are publicly available.
If forecasters know the average of one month old forecasts, then for normally 
distributed disturbances the expected squared error minimizing forecast will be a 
weighted average of the current signal, the month old signal and the average of 
month old forecasts. For a simple example the average of month old forecasts (/i) 
might be the optimal combination of all publicly available month old data. In 
this special case, the expected squared error minimizing forecast ( / |)  is a weighted 
average of the average of month old forecasts and the second period signal. The 
weight on the second signal increases in the quality of the second period signal. For 
a simple example in which both (y — sj2) and (y — /i)  are normally distributed, 
lower variance of (y — s*2) implies higher variance of ( /2 — /i). This suggests that 
it may be rational for forecasters to overstate the difference between their second 
period estimate of y and / j .  That is, forecasters may rationally put a higher weight 
on Si2 than would minimize expected squared forecast errors.
This version of rational cheating has two implications : first that (y — / i2) is 
positively correlated with (/i2 — f\)  and second that high mean squared (/t2 — /i)  
is correlated with low mean squared forecast errors.
The expected positive sign of the coefficient in the regression of (_/i2—y) on (/i2 — 
/i)  explains the finding reported in Ehrbeck [1992] which shows that forecasters 
choose to ignore the information contained in average of past predictions. Table 
4 reports the empirical results. The five sets of t-like statistics in Table 4 are 
calculated in the same way as in the previous section.
The first prediction of the model of rational boasting is strongly confirmed. 
However, it is important to note that these empirical results were calculated before 
the model was developed to explain them. Thus, the model of rational boasting is 
an ex-post rationalization which explains the results. The model was not used to 
make a prediction which was then confirmed. Again, we re- estimate the equations 
using back-casts in place of outcomes. As is shown in Table 5 the results are very 
similar.
In spite of the strong confirmation of the first prediction of the model of rational 
boasting, the model is false. The second prediction -  that large mean squared 
(/■2 — /i)  >s correlated with small mean squared forecast errors is equally strongly 
rejected as is shown in Table 6.
It is possible to understand this pattern using a behavioral model of bias. For 
example, forecasters might put too little weight on the lagged average because they 
are sincerely overconfident and not because they are strategically boasting. There 
is considerable evidence for subjective over-confidence in the absence of strategic 
motives for boasting [e.g. Einhorn and Hogarth 1978]. If the degree of subjective 
over confidence varies across forecasters, then other things equal (or uncorrelated) 
one would expect the more overconfident forecasters to announce forecasts further 





























































































The tests of rationality in survey data reported in the literature can be criti­
cized on the ground that professional forecasters’ true motives actually invalidate 
the auxiliary hypothesis of a quadratic loss function. We have therefore develop and 
test the implications of several models in which fully rational forecasters choose not 
to announce the conditional expected value of the forecasted variable in order to 
make clients over-estimate the quality of their advice. To arrive at testable predic­
tions, simple structures of an advising game have been studied. In our first model, 
professional forecasters are concerned about their reputation and when repeatedly 
announcing forecasts of a variable for the same target, they under-adjust old pre­
dictions in the light of new information. This model leads to the predictions that 
forecast errors are negatively correlated with changes in forecasts - an implication 
rejected by the data. Subsequent modelling attempts rationalize this empirically 
observed behavior by introducing a model of rational jumpiness. Here, professional 
forecasters over-adjust in the light of new information when making forecasts in 
order to make clients over-estimate the quality of advice that they are receiving. 
The prediction of this model is a positive correlation between forecast errors and 
changes in forecasts. However, this model falsely implies that forecasters with large 
changes in forecasts have small forecast errors. The opposite pattern is found in 
the data. A related model of rational boasting could explain why professional fore­
casters might choose to ignore the information contained in the average of past 
forecasts and why forecast errors might be correlated with the difference between 
the forecast and the lagged average forecast. But again, this model implies a false 
prediction -  in this case that forecasters with forecasts far from the lagged average 
have low forecast errors. Again, this is the opposite of the pattern found in the 
data.
The empirical results in this paper reject our advising games. For model speci­
fications that would explain the observed forecast error bias, the cross-sectional im­
plications are rejected, and for model specifications that have valid cross-sectional 
implications, the bias in the forecast error is unexplained. Thus, the data reject our 
general approach to rationalizing biased forecasts and not narrow assumptions of 
our models and thus reinforces evidence against the rational expectations hypoth­
esis. In contrast, the patterns we describe are consistent with behavioral models 
of bias. It is possible that our inability to reconcile the rational expectations hy­
pothesis with the stylized facts is the result of assumptions made for tractability. 
In particular, we assume that clients choose forecasters at random and only decide 
when to abandon their current forecaster. However, the overwhelming failure of 
several attempts to reconcile the rational expectations hypothesis with the data 
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Test of Rational Stubbornness
Dependent Variable: Forecast-Outcome
Regression Constant Change in forecast
Change 3rd-1st -0.006 0.127 N = 384





Change 2nd-lst -0.022 0.230 N = 396





Change 3rd-2nd -0.004 0.236 N = 385





OLS regressions with corrected standard errors 
In parentheses f-like statistics for Hq : (3 = 0
Sources and definitions of variables as described in text. N is the total number of observations 
used in the regression.
a) calculated assuming time invariant variances and covariances of disturbances. Each pair of 
individuals’ disturbances assumed to have the same correlation.
b) calculated without imposing restrictions on the variance covariance matrix of disturbances, 
except disturbances a t different times are assumed to be uncorrelated. Disturbances estimated 
from residuals of individual regressions corrected for the number of degrees of freedom lost in 
estimation.
c) Like b) except that disturbances are assumed to be equal to forecast errors.
d) Like b) except that disturbances are estimated with forecast error minus fitted value using 
coefficients from an individual regression excluding the period in question.
e) Like b) except that disturbances are estimated with forecast error minus fitted value using 





























































































Test of Rational Stubbornness
Dependent Variable: Forecast-Backcast
Regression Constant Change in forecast
1. Change 3rd-1st -0.007 0.125 N =  363





2. Change 2nd-1st -0.028 0.233 N =  374
month forecast (-1.392)“ (5.031)“ R2 =  0.11




3. Change 3rd-2nd -0.005 0.254 N =  366





OLS regressions with corrected standard errors 
In parentheses t-like statistics for H0 : /3 =  0
a,b,c,d,e) See notes to table 1.
Sources and definitions of variables as described in text.
Backcast is the average of the individual’s available responses under the heading “Treasury bill 
rate, three months, percent: Discount rate on new issues of 91-day Treasury bills. Based on 
the weekly auction average rates” for the previous quarter.





























































































Cross Sectional Test of Rational Stubbornness
Dependent Variable: Mean Squared Forecast Error
Regression Constant Mean sq Change in f’cast
1. 3rd month error -0.012 0.321 R2 =  0.573
on dif 3rd-lst (—1.695) (5.305)
Rank Correlation =  0.658
2. 2nd month error -0.003 0.633 R2 =  0.660
on dif 2nd-lst (—0.206) (6.383)
Rank Correlation =  0.131
3. 3rd month error 0.014 0.158 R2 =  0.382
on dif 3rd-2nd (2.729.) (3.601)
Rank Correlation =  0.818
OLS Regressions and Rank Correlation Coefficients
In parentheses f-like statistics for H0 : 0  = 0
Sources and definitions of variables as described in text. 
Regressions across 23 forecasters.





























































































Test of Rational Boasting
Dependent Variable: Forecast-Outcome
Regression Constant Forecast - lagged average
3rd month f’cast - -0.017 0.386 N =  419
1st month (-1.292)“ (8.718)“ R2 =  0.41




2nd Month f’cast - -0.035 0.609 N =  435






3rd Month f’cast - -0.012 0.787 N =  419
2nd Month (-1.061)“ (20.616)“ R2 = 0.77




OLS regressions with corrected standard errors 
In parentheses t-like statistics for Ho : /3 =  0
a,b,c,d,e) See notes to table 1.
Sources and definitions of variables as described in text.





























































































Test of Rational Boasting
Dependent Variable: Forecast-Backcast
Regression Constant Forecast - lagged average
3rd Month f’cast - -0.020 0.357 N =  397
1st Month (-1.734)“ (9.469)“ R2 = 0.37




2nd Month f’cast - -0.040 0.557 N =  411
1st Month (-1.652)“ (10.417)“ R2 =  0.43




3rd Month f’cast - -0.014 0.729 N =  397
2nd Month (-1.481)“ (22.027)“ R2 =  0.73




OLS regressions with corrected standard errors 
In parentheses f-like statistics for H0 : f3 — 0
a,b,c,d,e) See notes to table 1.
Sources and definitions of variables as described in text.
Backcast is the average of the individual’s available responses under the heading 
“Treasury  bill ra te , th ree  m onths, percent: Discount rate on new issues of 
91-day Treasury bills. Based on the weekly auction average rates” for the previous 
quarter.





























































































Cross Sectional Test of Rational Boasting
Dependent Variable: Mean Squared Forecast Error
Regression Constant Mean sq f’cast - lagged avg.
3rd month error -0.013 0.538 R2 =  0.621
on dif 3rd-lst avg (-1.939) (5.869)
Rank Correlation = 0.715
2nd month error -0.012 0.971 Ft2= 0.899
on dif 2nd-lst avg (-1.724) (13.654)
Rank Correlation = 0.552
3rd month error -0.004 0.905 R2 = 0.899
on dif 3rd-2nd avg (-1.557.) (13.648)
Rank Correlation = 0.942
OLS Regressions and Rank Correlation Coefficients 
In parentheses i-like statistics for H0 : /3 =  0
Sources and definitions of variables as described in text. 
Regressions across 23 forecasters.
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